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skilled and unskilled natives. Moreover, when we simulate the e¤ects of the actual
US immigration inux that took place between the years 2000 and 2009, we 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that both skilled and unskilled native workers gain. We also 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improvement in the transferability of human capital benets the high-skilled natives
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1 Introduction
Recent data show that a substantial number of workers are mismatched (see Leuven and
Oosterbeek, 2011). Moreover, the majority of them are overeducated, i.e., they have more
education than what their job requires.1
Ever since Richard Freemans controversial book The Overeducated American(Free-
man, 1976), labor market mismatch, and especially overeducation, has constantly been in
the research agenda of labor economists.2 A number of hypotheses have been put forward
to explain labor mismatch and overeducation in particular. A recently developed strand
of the literature is based on the search and matching approach of the labor market (e.g.,
Diamond, 1982; Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994). Accordingly, the labor market does
not clear instantaneously and qualication or skill mismatch is an outcome of frictions.
Workers and rms search for trading partners and, since the matching technology is im-
perfect, skilled or highly educated workers may end up in unskilled jobs for which they
are overeducated or overqualied. In a paper by Albrecht and Vroman (Albrecht and
Vroman, 2002), one of the rst in this literature, high-skilled workers can be permanently
mismatched with low-skill jobs. Gautier (2002) and Dolado, Jansen and Jimeno (2009)
allow for on-the-job search conducted by mismatched workers, which makes any such skill
mismatches transitory; that is, initially high-skilled workers accept low-skill jobs but then
climb the occupational ladder through on-the-job search.3 Finally, Chassamboulli (2011)
develops a similar model to match some of the business cycle properties of labor market
variables.
Qualication mismatch is an even more prominent feature among immigrants (see,
among others, Chiswick and Miller, 2009, and Beckhusen, Florax, Poot and Waldorf,
2013, for the US; Chiswick and Miller, 2010, for Australia and comparisons with the
US and Canada; Aleksynska and Tritah, 2013, and Nieto, Matano and Ramos, 2013, for
1Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011) report that the average share of overeducated workers over many
empirical studies that use data from di¤erent countries, over di¤erent decades and collected using di¤erent
methods is 30 percent.
2The case where an employees education or skill level di¤ers from what the job requires is known
as vertical mismatch,e.g., a college graduate works at a position that requires at most a high-school
diploma. On the contrary, when the employees type of education or skill is di¤erent from what the job
requires then there exists horizontal mismatch,e.g., an employee works in a eld di¤erent from the one
for which she was trained. In this paper, since there is essentially only one good, we analyze only the case
of vertical mismatch. For a comprehensive survey of the overeducation and labor mismatch literature
see, among others, Leuven and Oosterbeek (2011).
3On-the-job search by overqualied employees and job-to-job transitions are widely observed phenom-
ena in modern labor markets; see the evidence summarized in Dolado et al. (2009).
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Europe.4 For example, evidence summarized in Piracha and Vadean (2013) shows that
the incidence of overeducation among immigrants ranges from 13.2 percent in the case
of Bangladeshi in the UK to 58.1 percent in the case of female immigrants residing in
New Zealand for less than ve years. Moreover, Beckhusen et al. (2013), who analyze the
US data between the years 1980-2009, conclude that overeducation among high-skilled
immigrants vastly exceeds that of comparable natives (p. 834). Also, Aleksynska and
Tritah (2013) nd that 22 percent of immigrants in Europe are overeducated compared
to only 13 percent of the native born.
The literature has identied as one of the main reasons for the higher degree of educa-
tional mismatch among immigrants the imperfect transferability of human capital across
countries, which may be the result, among others, of lack of language skills, cultural and
economic di¤erences between the country of origin and the country of destination and oc-
cupational licensing requirements. A plethora of studies have demonstrated for di¤erent
countries that immigrants earn a lower marginal return on their human capital compared
to natives (see Chiswick, 1978; Baker and Benjamin, 1994; Bell, 1997; Constant and
Massey, 2003; Longva and Raaum, 2003, to name but a few). Other studies have shown
that human capital acquired by immigrants in their country of origin is paid signicantly
less than human capital acquired in the country of destination (see Friedberg, 2000, and
Nielsen, 2007).
This paper studies these issues following the search and matching approach for the
analysis of the impact of immigration (see Ortega, 2000; Liu, 2010; Chassamboulli and
Palivos, 2013, 2014; Chassamboulli and Peri, 2014; Battisti, Felbermayr, Peri, and Pout-
vaara, 2014). This approach allows one to analyze the e¤ects of immigration on unem-
ployment and wages that result from the impact of changes in the availability of jobs on
the bargaining position of workers. More specically, we develop a search and matching
model along the lines of Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002) and Dolado et al.
(2009), to analyze the e¤ects of educational mismatch among immigrants on the labor
market outcomes in the host country. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst pa-
per that does this. In particular, rst, we study the consequences of cross-skill matching
among immigrants, i.e., the presence of mismatched immigrant workers, for natives, both
skilled and unskilled. Second, we examine the e¤ects of new skilled and unskilled immi-
4Piracha and Vadean (2013) present a summary of the ndings from the literature on educational
mismatch of immigrants.
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gration when there is cross-skill matching. Finally, we investigate the results of improving
the transferability of human capital across countries.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and nd a number of new and interesting
results. First, the presence of mismatched workers benets the unskilled and hurts the
skilled native workers. This is so, because cross-skill matching raises the outside option
of high-skilled immigrants, which increases their wage and discourages job entry. On the
other hand, high-skilled immigrants have a lower outside option than low-skilled natives
and hence allowing for cross-skill matching lowers the wage that a low-skill rm expects
to pay and spurs entry in the low-skill sector.
Similarly, new unskilled immigration benets the low-skilled native workers and hurts
the high-skilled. Since immigrants have a higher search cost than natives, they are forced
to accept lower wages. Hence, an increase in the number of unskilled immigrants reduces
the labor cost that a low-skill rm expects to pay. On the other hand, it raises the outside
option of mismatched workers (it is easier for them to nd a low-skill job) and hence it
increases the labor cost that a high-skill rm expects to pay. Consequently, the increase
in unskilled immigration induces entry in the low-skill and exit in the high-skill sector.
This results in a higher (lower) wage and employment rate for low-skilled (high-skilled)
natives.
On the other hand, new skilled immigration benets both skilled and unskilled natives.
Once again, the lower wage received by immigrants, owing to their higher search cost,
induces entry and increases the number of jobs in the high-skill sector. This raises the
wage and the employment rate of high-skilled natives. It also decreases the number of
mismatched high-skilled immigrants and hence benets the low-skilled natives as well.
Moreover, when we simulate the e¤ects of an immigration inux that is of the same
magnitude and composition as the one that took place in the US between the years 2000
and 2009, we nd that both skilled and unskilled gain from it.
Finally, we show that initially, i.e., for a high overeducation ratio, an improvement in
the transferability of human capital across borders benets the high-skilled natives at the
expense of the low-skilled. This takes place because the improvement in the transferability
of human capital increases the probability that a high-skilled immigrant will match with
a high-skill rm, while at the same time it increases the separation between low-skill rms
and high-skilled immigrants (it becomes easier for mismatched immigrants to nd jobs
in the high-skill sector through on-the-job search and quit their current job in the low-
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skill sector). As a consequence, more (less) rms enter the high-skill (low-skill) sector,
which explains why high-skilled natives benet and low-skilled lose. Nevertheless, below a
certain overeducation ratio, further improvements in the transferability of human capital
increase the wage of high-skilled immigrants so much that they reverse the ow direction
and turn rm entry into exit; thus, both skilled and unskilled native workers become now
worse o¤ in terms of wages and employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and solves
for the wages, the unemployment rates and the overeducation ratio. Section 3 analyzes the
e¤ects of a) cross-skill matching, b) an increase in immigration, and c) an improvement
in the transferability of foreign human capital. Section 4 calibrates the model to the
US data and presents simulation results for the changes analyzed theoretically in the
aforementioned sections. Finally, Section 5 o¤ers some concluding remarks. There is
also an Appendix, which provides detailed proofs of the propositions and performs an
extensive sensitivity analysis of our results.
2 The Model
This section introduces our dynamic search and matching model with ex-ante heteroge-
neous agents. Time is continuous. All agents are risk neutral and discount the future at
a constant rate r > 0:
2.1 The Basic Setup
Consider an economy inhabited by a continuum of workers who are either natives (N)
or immigrants (I) and are indexed by  2 fN; Ig. The measure of native workers is
normalized to 1, while that of immigrants is constant and denoted by I. Besides their
country of origin, workers di¤er also with respect to their skills. They are either high-
skilled (also referred to simply as skilled) or low-skilled (unskilled):We use the index i to
distinguish their skill level, i 2 fH;Lg; where H stands for high- and L for low-skilled.
The share of high-skilled workers in the native population is represented by  2 (0; 1);
thus, 1   is the fraction of native workers that are low-skilled. Similarly, the measures
of high-skilled and low-skilled immigrants are denoted by IH and IL, respectively.
There is also a large continuum of rms. Each rm can have at most one job, which
is suited either for a skilled (H) or for an unskilled (L) worker. We use the index j to
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distinguish between the two types of jobs, j 2 fH;Lg. Firms must decide ex ante, that
is, before searching for a worker, whether they will open a skilled or an unskilled job.
For simplicity, we assume that creating a vacancy is costless, although this can be easily
amended following, for example, Laing, Palivos and Wang (1995, 2003). A skilled job can
be lled only by a skilled (native or immigrant) worker. The ow of output produced by
such a pair is yH . By contrast, an unskilled job, one that needs no special skill, can be
lled by an unskilled (native or immigrant) worker whose constant ow of productivity
in this type of job is yL. Moreover, as mentioned in the Introduction, empirical evidence
typically suggests that educational mismatch is pronounced for immigrants in the labor
market of the host countries. To account for this, we assume that an unskilled job can also
be occupied by a skilled immigrant.5 Moreover, the productivity of a skilled immigrant
in an unskilled job is yL with   1:6
2.2 Search and Matching
Each rm posts either a skilled or an unskilled vacancy and incurs a ow cost cj, j = H;L;
until the vacancy is lled. Free entry determines endogenously the number of rms in
each labor market. On the other hand, unemployed workers search for employment. In
particular, skilled native workers direct their search towards the skilled labor market,
whereas unskilled natives and immigrants search for unskilled jobs. Finally, as mentioned
above, skilled immigrants search for jobs in both markets. We also allow for on-the-job
search by skilled immigrants who have been matched with unskilled vacancies (mismatched
workers). A mismatched skilled immigrant worker can therefore move to a better job
without an intervening spell of unemployment, i.e., skilled immigrants may experience
job-to-job transition.
During unemployment, workers receive a ow of income bi < yi; which captures the
opportunity cost of employment, e.g., the payo¤ from home production, leisure, and
unemployment benets. Moreover, job seekers incur a cost of searching for a job, h;
 = N; I: In general, one expects hN < hI ; since immigrants face a higher search cost than
natives when they search in a foreign country (see also Ortega 2000 and Chassamboulli and
5In other words, to simplify the analysis, we assume that there is a social stigma against native skilled
workers who occupy unskilled jobs. We note, however, that, at the expense of simplicity, this result can
be derived endogenously given that, as we assume below, skilled native and immigrant workers have the
same productivity but di¤erent search cost.
6Gautier (2002) assumes that  can be on either side of unity, whereas Belan, Carré and Gregoir
(2010) assume essentially that   1:
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Palivos 2014, who make the same assumption). Without loss of generality we normalize hN
to zero. Of course, having a job helps immigrants to get assimilated and gives them access
to a network associated with that job. For these reasons, we assume that a mismatched
worker who conducts on-the-job search bears a lower cost than an unemployed skilled
immigrant worker. More specically, the search cost for a mismatched worker is hI , where
 2 [0; 1]: Thus, all ve types of job seekers have di¤erent net income.7 Unemployed skilled
and unskilled native workers have income bi; i = H;L and zero search cost, unemployed
skilled and unskilled immigrant workers have income bi and search cost hI and mismatched
skilled immigrant workers have income equal to their wage wIHL and search cost h
I :
Job seekers and vacant jobs are matched randomly in a pair-wise fashion. As in Gautier
(2002) and Belan, Carré and Gregoir (2010), search is directed. The matching function
in the unskilled labor market is M(vL; uNL + u
I
L + u
I
H); where vL is the mass of unskilled
vacancies and ui denotes the mass of unemployed workers of skill type i = H;L and origin
 = N; I. Similarly, the matching function in the skilled labor market isM(vH ; uNH+u
I
H+
eIHL; ); where vH is the mass of skilled vacancies and e
I
HL is the mass of mismatched skilled
immigrant workers; the latter continue to search on the job for better employment. The
matching functions M(:) are assumed to be twice continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly concave with respect to each of their arguments, exhibit constant
returns to scale and satisfy standard Inada conditions.
We dene the labor market tightness in the unskilled labor market as L = vL=(uNL +
uIL + u
I
H) and in the skilled as H = vH=(u
N
H + u
I
H + e
I
HL): The rate at which low-skill
vacancies are lled is q(L) = ML=vL; where ML denotes the matches in the unskilled
labor market and q0(L) < 0: The rate at which unemployed low-skilled (native or immi-
grant) workers and high-skilled immigrants nd low-skill jobs is m(L) = Lq(L); where
m0(L) > 0:
On the other hand, a match between a high-skill vacancy and a skilled immigrant
worker may not be consummated due to the fact that foreign human capital may not be
easily transferable in the host country. As mentioned in the Introduction, this may be
due to lack of language skills, lack of information regarding the education system in the
immigrants home country, cultural di¤erences, licensing requirements, etc. We capture
this by allowing the transition rates from unemployment to employment for immigrant
and native skilled workers to di¤er. In particular, the rate at which unemployed high-
7As we show below, even all types of employed workers have di¤erent income.
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skilled native workers nd high-skill jobs ism(H) = Hq(H); wherem0(H) > 0; whereas
the corresponding rate for high-skilled immigrant workers is lower and equal to m(H);
 < 1: The parameter  is meant to capture imperfect transferability of human capital
across borders.8
We also assume that all matches dissolve at an exogenous rate sj; which is specic to
their type. Nevertheless, the total turnover of mismatched workers has one more compo-
nent, m(H); which is endogenous. In other words, since mismatched workers conduct
on-the-job search, a match between a skilled immigrant and a low-skill job dissolves either
because the job is destroyed by a shock or because the worker decides to quit and work
for a high-skill job. The former occurs at a rate sL and the latter at a rate m(H); hence,
for this and only this type of matches, the total separation rate is sL + m(H):
2.3 Asset Values
In general, we let and V be the values associated with a lled and an unlled vacancy and
E and U the values associated with an employed and an unemployed worker, respectively.
More specically, we let ij be the present discounted value associated with a rm of type
j that is matched with a worker of skill i and origin .9 Then in steady state:
rij = yi   wij   sj
 
ij   Vj

; if i = j = H;L; and  = N; I; (1)
rIHL = yL   wIHL   [sL + m(H)]
 
IHL   VL

; (2)
where wij is the wage rate of a worker who has skill i = H;L and origin  = N; I
and is matched with a position of type j = H;L and Vj is the value associated with
a type j unlled (vacant) position. Notice that although skilled immigrant workers in
an unskilled job can be more productive than unskilled immigrant or native workers (if
 > 1), their job separation rate is also higher (sL+m(H) > sL): This is because skilled
immigrant workers in an unskilled job continue to search for a skilled position. Overall, it
is ambiguous which of the two types of workers will result in a higher prot for the rm.
8The fact that, compared to natives, the probability of a match is lower only for skilled immigrants,
and not for unskilled, supports our idea that  < 1 captures the imperfect transferability of foreign human
capital instead of, for example, the existence of discrimination.
9It may be recalled that high-skill positions can be lled only with high-skilled workers but low-skill
positions can be lled either by low-skilled workers (natives or immigrants) or by high-skilled immigrants;
hence, there are ve possible combinations: NLL; 
N
HH ; 
I
LL; 
I
HH ; 
I
HL:
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The expected income streams accrued to unlled vacancies of type j = H;L are given
by
rVH =  cH + q(H)

NHH
N
HH + (1  NHH)IHH   VH

; (3)
rVL =  cL + q(L)[NLLNLL + ILLILL + (1  NLL   ILL)IHL   VL]; (4)
where ij represents the probability that a vacancy of type j meets a worker of skill i and
of origin . More specically,
NHH =
uNH
uNH + u
I
H + e
I
HL
; NLL =
uNL
uNL + u
I
L + u
I
H
; ILL =
uIL
uNL + u
I
L + u
I
H
: (5)
We turn next to the asset values associated with the workers. The expected income
streams accrued to employed workers are given by
rEij = w

ij   sj(Eij   Ui ); if i = j = H;L and  = N; I; (6)
rEIHL = w
I
HL   hI   sL(EIHL   U IH) + m(H)(EIHH   EIHL): (7)
In particular, equation (7) gives the ow income accrued to a skilled immigrant worker
in an unskilled position, i.e., a mismatched worker. The last term on the right-hand side
(RHS) gives the change in this value because of the on-the-job search option. We also
assume that wages are constantly renegotiated at no cost. Hence, in the end, the outside
option of a mismatched worker coincides with that of an unemployed. This implies that
the wage of a skilled immigrant who matches with a skilled job is independent of the
workers previous employment status, that is, at skilled jobs unemployed and mismatched
immigrants receive the same wage wIHH (for further details see Gautier, 2002, and Dolado
et al., 2009, who make the same assumption).
Similarly, the values associated with unemployed workers are:
rUNi = bi +m(i)(E
N
ij   UNi ); if i = j = H;L; (8)
rU IL = bL   hI +m(L)(EILL   U IL); (9)
rU IH = bH   hI +m(L)(EIHL   U IH) + m(H)(EIHH   U IH): (10)
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Finally, we assume free entry in establishing either type of vacancy. Thus, in equilib-
rium, the expected payo¤ of posting a vacancy is equal to zero, that is,
Vj = 0; j = H;L: (11)
2.4 Wage Determination
Once a worker meets a rm, they bargain over the wage rate. They essentially solve a
generalized Nash bargaining problem given by
Max
wij
(Eij   Ui )(ij   Vj)(1 );
where Eij   Ui and ij   Vj are the workers and the rms surpluses from the match,
respectively. Moreover,  2 (0; 1) denotes the workers and 1    the rms bargaining
strength. The rm and the worker jointly seek to nd the wage wij that solves the
aforementioned problem. The solution gives
(1  )(Eij   Ui ) = (ij   Vj). (12)
In other words, the worker gets a share  and the rm 1    of the total surplus Sij =
ij + E

ij   Vj   Ui generated from a match. Then, by using the above asset value
equations, we can derive the expressions for the wage rates wij.
Substituting for Eij Ui and ij, using equations (1)-(10), in equation (12) and noting
that Vj = 0 (equation 11), we nd
wNij =
 [r + sj +m(i)] yi + (1  )(r + sj)bi
	(i)
; if i = j = H;L; (13)
wILL =
 [r + sL +m(L)] yL + (1  )(r + sL)(bL   hI)
	(L)
= wNLL  
(1  )(r + sL)
	(L)
hI ; (14)
wIHL =
 [r + sL +m(L) + m(H)]yL + (1  )[r + sL + m(H)][bH   (1  )hI ]
	(L) + m(H)
;
(15)
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wIHH =
 [r + sH + m(H)] yH + (1  )(r + sH)
h
bH   hI + m(L)fyL [bH (1 )hI ]g	(L)+m(H)
i
	(H)  (1  )m(H) ;
(16)
where 	(i)  r + sj + m(i); i = j = H;L: In each case, the wage is basically a
combination of the workers outside option and job productivity.
Comparing the wages for skilled and unskilled native workers (equation 13), we see
that, ceteris paribus, the di¤erence wNHH   wNLL depends positively on the di¤erence be-
tween the workersproductivities yH yL and their outside of employment income bH bL
and negatively on the di¤erence in the probabilities of losing their jobs, i.e., the separation
rates sH   sL: It is expected that yH > yL; bH > bL and sH < sL and hence wNHH > wNLL:
Moreover, it follows from equation (14) that unskilled immigrant workers receive a lower
wage than unskilled natives (wILL < w
N
LL); despite the fact that they are equally produc-
tive. This occurs because immigrants face a higher search cost (hI > 0 = hN), which
forces them to accept lower wages.
Next, we compare the di¤erence between the wage of an unskilled immigrant worker
wILL; given by equation (14), with that of a mismatched worker (a skilled immigrant worker
who works in an unskilled job) wIHL; which is given by equation (15). There are three
sources of di¤erentiation between the two wages. First, mismatched immigrants have a
higher separation rate than unskilled immigrants (sL + m(H) > sL): This lowers the
size of the expected surplus generated from a match between a skilled immigrant and an
unskilled job, which leads to a lower wage for mismatched workers. Second, mismatched
workers can be more productive (if  > 1); which raises their wage. Third, the two
types of workers have di¤erent outside options, which a¤ect their bargaining positions,
bH   (1   )hI vis-à-vis bL   hI : Assuming that bH > bL > bL   hI ; this e¤ect also
raises the di¤erence between the two wages, wIHL   wILL: Nevertheless, the overall e¤ect
is ambiguous; in other words, either of the two wages can be higher than the other. In
fact, one can nd the value of  that equates the two wages or the two surpluses, as in
Gautier (2002).
Finally, let us compare the wage of a skilled immigrant who is matched with a high-
skill position (wIHH) with the wage of a native counterpart (w
N
HH); compare equation (13)
for i = j = H with equation (16). There are two opposing channels. On the one hand,
immigrants are subject to higher search costs (hI > 0 = hN) and they face a lower job
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nding rate (because of the low transferability of foreign human capital, which results
in  < 1): Both of these e¤ects lower immigrantsbargaining position and hence their
wage (wIHH < w
N
HH). On the other hand, skilled immigrants have the opportunity to ll
an unskilled job, which raises their bargaining position and their wage rate in tandem
(wIHH > w
N
HH).
2.5 Steady-State Composition of the Labor Force
The following denitions apply regarding the di¤erent sub-groups in the labor force:
uNH + e
N
HH = ;
uNL + e
N
LL = 1  ;
uIH + e
I
HL + e
I
HH = IH ;
uIL + e
I
LL = IL;
where, following our previous notation, eij denotes the mass of employed workers who are
of skill type i and origin  and are matched with a vacancy of skill type j: According
to each of the above equations, a member of a sub-group can be in one of two states,
either unemployed or matched with a vacancy of the same skill, with the exception of the
high-skilled immigrants, who can also be mismatched.
Moreover, in steady state, where the ows in and out of unemployment for each skill
sub-group are equal to each other, we have
uNH = 
sH
sH +m(H)
; eNHH = 
m(H)
sH +m(H)
;
uNL = (1  )
sL
sL +m(L)
; eNLL = (1  )
m(L)
sL +m(L)
;
uIL = IL
sL
sL +m(L)
; eILL = IL
m(L)
sL +m(L)
; (17)
uIH = IH
sH [sL + m(H)]
[sH + m(H)][sL +m(L) + m(H)]
; eIHH = IH
m(H)
sH + m(H)
;
eIHL = IH
sHm(L)
[sH + m(H)][sL +m(L) + m(H)]
:
Note that eIHL=(e
I
HL+ e
I
HH) is a measure of the overeducation ratio or the mismatch ratio
among skilled immigrants.10
10In our model, the overeducation ratio and the mismatch ratio coincide.
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Next, using the above equations, we can rewrite the expressions regarding the proba-
bility that a rm nds a worker of a particular type (equations 5) as
NHH =

+ IH
H
; NLL =
1  
1  + IL + IH
L ; 
I
LL =
IL
1  + IL + IH
L ; (18)
where the expression for 
H is given by

H =
(uIH + e
I
HL)=IH
uNH=
=
sH +m(H)
sH + m(H)
 1:
The term 
H is greater than unity because the fraction of the native skilled workers who
seek employment in the skilled sector is lower than that of the skilled immigrants, since
the former nd jobs at a higher rate than the latter (m(H)  m(H)): Similarly,

L =
uIH=IH
uIL=IL
=
uIH=IH
uNL =1  
=
sH [sL + m(H)][sL +m(L)]
sL[sH + m(H)][sL +m(L) + m(H)]
:
Notice that if sH = sL = s; then

L =
s+m(L)
s+m(L) + m(H)
< 1;
i.e., the fraction of skilled immigrants who seek employment is lower than that of the
unskilled immigrants (or natives), since the former nd jobs at a higher rate (m(L) +
m(H) > m(L)) and both groups lose jobs at the same rate (s).
3 Steady-State Equilibrium Analysis
Denition. A steady-state equilibrium is a set fj ; eij ; ui ; wij g; where i; j 2 fH;Lg
and  2 fN; Ig, such that: a) the free-entry condition (11) for vacancies of each skill type
j is satised, b) the Nash bargaining optimality condition (12) for each skill type i and
origin j holds, and c) the numbers of employed and unemployed workers for each skill
type i and origin j remain constant and are given by equations (17).
Using equations (3), (4) and the free-entry conditions (equation 11), we derive the
following system
cH
q(H)
=
1  
+ IH
H

(yH   bH)
	(H)
(19)
+
IH
H
r + sH + m(H)

yH   bH + hI   m(L)fyL   [bH   (1  )h
I ]g
	(L) + m(H)

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cL
q(L)
=
1  
1  + IL + IH


(1  + IL)(yL   bL) + ILhI
	(L)
+
IH
LfyL   [bH   (1  )hI ]g
	(L) + m(H)

(20)
The system of equations (19) and (20) describes the behavior of the two variables that
measure the tightness in each market: H and L: Having determined 

H and 

L, we
can obtain the equilibrium values of all other endogenous variables by substituting in the
appropriate equations.
We are primarily interested in an equilibrium with the following features: a) both
skilled and unskilled natives and immigrants are employed, b) there is cross-skill matching
in which high-skilled immigrants work in both types of jobs and c) high-skilled immigrants
conduct on-the-job search while employed in low-skill jobs. As shown in Appendix A.1.1,
for such an equilibrium to exist the following restrictions on the parameter values must
hold: yi > bi; i = H;L; yL > bH   (1  )hI and
yH > bH   hI + r + sH + m(H) + m(L)
	(L) + m(H)
fyL   [bH   (1  )hI ]g;
(Condition for OTJ search)
where the last condition is necessary for the existence of on-the-job (OTJ) search; it
implies that the surplus generated by a skilled immigrant and a skilled job is higher
than that generated by a skilled immigrant and an unskilled job. Moreover, as shown in
Appendix A.1.1, the Condition for OTJ search is su¢ cient for the employability of high-
skilled immigrants (EHSI) in high-skill jobs (see the Condition for EHSI in Appendix
A.1.1). Notice that the Condition for OTJ search holds if, for example, yH > yL   hI
and sH = sL; since, in this case, skilled immigrants in high-skill jobs receive a higher wage
than mismatched immigrants and face the same probability of layo¤ when matched with
a skilled vacancy (it may be recalled that 	(L)  r + sL + m(L)). Hence, it pays for
them to look for a high-skill job.
Finally, in the text below, we also analyze the case where yL = bH   (1   )hI ;
as a benchmark case in which there is no cross-skill matching in equilibrium and hence
there are no over-qualied immigrant workers, i.e., as shown in the Appendix A.1.1, when
yL = bH   (1   )hI , in equilibrium IHL = 0 and EIHL = U IH and thus eIHL = 0. In
other words, for this parameter conguration, there exists an equilibrium with ex post
segmentation (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Dolado et al., 2009). In this equilibrium,
high-skilled immigrants only take high-skill jobs.
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Proposition 1. Under certain parameter restrictions, a steady-state equilibrium exists
and is unique.
Proof: All proofs are presented in Appendix A.1.
Consider next the e¤ects of H and L on wages and (un)employment rates.
Proposition 2. E¤ects on wages and employment:
a)
dwNHH
dH
> 0;
dwIHL
dH
< 0;
dwIHH
dH
? 0; dw
N
LL
dL
> 0;
dwILL
dL
> 0;
dwIHL
dL
> 0;
dwIHH
dL
> 0:
b)
duNi
di
< 0 and
deNij
di
> 0; i = j = H;L;
duIL
dL
< 0 and
deILL
dL
> 0;
deIHH
dH
> 0
deIHL
dL
> 0;
duIH
dL
< 0;
deIHL
dH
< 0; and
duIH
dH
< 0 if sH < sL:
All other cross-market e¤ects are zero.
An increase in H increases the probability that skilled native workers nd a job
and hence raises their bargaining position and their wages (wNHH). It also increases the
separation rate between a skilled immigrant and a low skill position, thus reducing wIHL:
Finally, on the one hand, it raises the matching probability of high-skilled immigrant
workers, but, on the other hand, it lowers their outside option by reducing wIHL. Hence,
it has an ambiguous e¤ect on wIHH :
Next, consider an increase in L: Naturally, it has a positive e¤ect on the wages of
low-skilled natives and immigrants (wNLL and w
I
LL). It also increases the outside option of
high-skilled immigrants and raises their wages (wIHL and w
I
HH):
An increase in the tightness in market i raises the probability of nding a job for work-
ers of the same type and hence it lowers their unemployment level (raises their employment
level). The employment level of mismatched workers (eIHL) and the unemployment level
of high-skilled immigrants (uIH), in particular, depend on both tightness measures H and
L. An increase in L raises the job nding rate of mismatched workers and thus increases
their employment level and decreases the unemployment of high-skilled immigrants. On
the other hand, an increase in H results in a higher separation rate for mismatched work-
ers and raises the job-nding rate for high-skilled immigrants. Consequently, there is a
negative e¤ect on the employment level of mismatched workers eIHL and an ambiguous
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e¤ect on the unemployment level of high-skilled immigrants uIH (since there is also a pos-
itive e¤ect on the employment level of high-skilled immigrants in high skill jobs, eIHH).
Under the mild condition that sH < sL, the e¤ect on the unemployment level uIH becomes
negative.11
3.1 The E¤ects of Cross-Skill Matching
Next, we compare two otherwise identical economies: one with and one without cross-skill
matching. In the rst there exists an equilibrium in which skilled immigrants accept both
high- and low-skill jobs (a cross-skill matching equilibrium), while in the second there ex-
ists an equilibrium in which skilled immigrants refuse to take low-skill jobs (an ex post seg-
mentation equilibrium). The two equilibria occur for di¤erent parameter congurations;
in particular, as mentioned above the latter equilibrium emerges if yL  bH   (1  )hI :
The following proposition analyzes the e¤ects of cross-skill matching, i.e., the presence of
over-qualied immigrants, on native workers.
Proposition 3. a) The presence of over-qualied immigrants hurts the high-skilled native
workers. b) If  = 1 and bH   (1  )hI > bL; then it hurts the low-skilled native workers
as well.
As we show in Appendix A.1.4, the presence of over-qualied immigrants results in a
lower tightness in the high-skilled market H : This is so, because cross-skill matching raises
the outside option of high-skilled immigrants, which raises their wage and discourages job
entry. Recall, from Proposition 2 above, that lower H decreases the bargaining position
of high-skilled native workers, which lowers their wage wNHH : Moreover, the nding rate
of high skill jobs for these workers goes down and thus their unemployment rate, uNH=;
goes up. Hence, high-skilled native workers lose both in terms of wages and employment.
We note that a corresponding result for low-skilled native workers cannot in general
be established. In other words, the e¤ect of cross-skill matching on L is in general
ambiguous. This is so for the following reasons: a) high-skilled immigrants may have
higher output (recall that   1); b) on the other hand, they have a higher outside option
than low-skilled natives and immigrants (if bH   (1  )hI > bL) and c) they search on
the job, which results in higher separation rate. Whereas the rst reason encourages entry
of low-skill jobs and tends to raise L; the last two discourage entry and lower L: When
11The condition sH < sL is veried in the data (see our next section).
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 = 1; the rst reason is cancelled; hence, only the last two reasons are valid and these
lead to lower tightness in the low-skill labor market. It follows then that the presence
of over-qualied immigrants leads to a lower L and, from Proposition 2, this hurts the
low-skilled native workers both in terms of employment and wages. Note, however, that
if  > 1 or bH   (1  )hI < bL, then the presence of overqualied immigrants has an
ambiguous e¤ect on low-skilled native workers.
3.2 The E¤ects of Immigration
In Proposition 3, we kept the number of immigrants constant and compared the labor
market outcomes in two economies: one in which there is and one in which there is no
cross-kill matching. In the following proposition, we analyze the e¤ects on native workers
of a change in the number of skilled and unskilled immigrants when there is cross-skill
matching.
Proposition 4. Under conditions that ensure the existence and the uniqueness of a
steady state: a) If  = 1; then an increase in unskilled immigration (IL) benets the
unskilled native workers both in terms of employment and wages and hurts the skilled
ones, b) If  = 1;  = 1 and hI is high enough (hI > mL (yL   bH) = (	L +mH));
then an increase in skilled immigration (IH) benets the skilled natives both in terms of
employment and wages, but still has an ambiguous e¤ect on the unskilled ones.
The low-skilled immigrants have the same productivity as low-skilled natives and
mismatched immigrants (if  = 1): At the same time, they receive a lower wage than
unskilled natives because they have a lower outside option.12 Thus, an increase in their
number raises the probability that a low-skill job nds a low-skilled immigrant, with
a concomitant increase in the expected prot from the creation of a low-skill position.
This spurs low-skill job entry, which raises the market tightness measure L; the low-skill
native wage wNLL and the low-skill employment level e
N
LL in tandem. Since there are now
more low-skill vacancies, it is easier for high-skilled immigrants to nd employment in
the low-skill market. Thus, they can bargain for a higher wage in the high-skill market,
which decreases the prots of posing high-skill vacancies. Hence, rms post less high-skill
vacancies than before and this leads to a lower wage and a lower employment level for
high-skilled native workers. This cross-market e¤ect would be absent in a similar model
12As explained above, they may even receive a lower wage than the mismatched immigrants.
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without cross-skill matching.
If the search cost of high-skilled immigrants exceeds the increase in their outside option
because of the possibility of cross-skill matching and  = 1, then skilled immigrants receive
a lower wage than skilled natives (see equations 13 and 16, where if  =  = 1 and hI >
mL (yL   bH) = (	L +mH) ; then wIHH < wNHH). Thus, an increase in skilled immigration
raises the probability that a high-skill rm matches with a high-skilled immigrant and
hence the expected prot from such a match. As a consequence, more high-skill jobs
open and this increases the tightness measure H ; the wage wNHH and the employment
level eNHH : Even in this simplied case, however, the e¤ect of high-skill immigration on
low-skilled natives is ambiguous. The increase in H lowers the number of high-skilled
immigrants who are unemployed (if sH < sL; see Proposition 2) and this tends to increase
L: Nevertheless, the number of low-skill positions also decreases, since the separation
rate between them and mismatched workers goes up. Thus, the overall e¤ect on L is
ambiguous.
3.3 The E¤ects of an Improvement in the Transferability of For-
eign Human Capital
In the third exercise, we consider an improvement in the transferability of human capital
across borders, which in our model is captured by an increase in . In practice, there are
several ways that this can be done. For example, one way to improve the transferability of
human capital is to have foreign credentials assessed in the host country by independent
organizations. To this end, several governments around the world have established foreign
credential evaluation agencies.13 Another possible way is the establishment of transparent
licensing requirements for all applicants, and especially foreign trained professionals.14
Moreover, bridging programs that enhance occupation-specic language prociency and
train with regard to licensing requirements and workplace norms in the host county can
expedite the assimilation process for skilled immigrants. Finally, a better match in the
13For example, the Canadian government established in 2007 the Foreign Credentials Referral O¢ ce.
In the US, whereas there is no such government agency, they are two private non-prot organizations that
provide evaluations of foreign academic credential services, the Association of International Credential
Evaluators and the National Association of Credential Evaluation Services, which have their own Codes
of Conduct.
14For example, in 2006, the Ontario Legislature enacted the Fair Access to Regulated Professions Act
to help immigrants qualify for thirty four provincially regulated professions. The Act requires profes-
sional associations to provide registration practices for foreign-trained professionals that are transparent,
objective, impartial and fair.Since then, other Canadian provinces have made similar commitments.
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labor market can occur through the selection of immigrants. For example, Australia
is among the countries that have established a point system, which is intended as an
objective method of selecting immigrant workers with the skills and attributes needed
in the country. The success of such a system is reected in the fact that Australian
immigrants that were not selected based on skills (e.g., family-based immigrants) have
the highest probability of being overeducated (see also Piracha and Vadean, 2013).
An increase in the transferability of human capital a¤ects unskilled and skilled na-
tive workers via the tightness measures H and L: In general, the e¤ects are ambiguous
because an increase in ; one the one hand, raises the matching rate for high-skilled immi-
grants, but on the other, it also raises the separation rate between high-skilled immigrants
and low-skill jobs. The rst e¤ect tends to raise the wage of mismatched workers while
the second lowers it. As a result, there are countervailing e¤ects applied on the tightness
measures.
4 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we calibrate the model to the US data and obtain quantitative results
regarding the e¤ects of a) cross-skill matching, b) immigration, and c) an improvement in
the transferability of human capital. We use the parameter values to match the U.S. data
for the period 1990-1999. We then simulate the e¤ects of the increase in immigration that
took place over the decade 2000-2009.
We are primarily interested in the e¤ects on the wages and unemployment rates of
skilled and unskilled native workers. Nevertheless, following, among others, Acemoglu
(2001) and Chassamboulli and Palivos (2013, 2014), we also calculate the impact of im-
migration on the total steady-state surplus of the economy, i.e., the total income accrued
to natives net of the ow cost of vacancies. We make the assumption that all rms be-
long to natives, who receive all the prots. Thus, our measure of net income to natives
(labelled surplus1) is
surplus1 = (eNHH + e
I
HH)yH + (e
N
LL + e
I
LL)yL + e
I
HLyL + u
N
HbH + u
N
L bL
 vHcH   vLcL   eIHHwIHH   eILLwILL   eIHLwIHL:
We also compute an alternative measure of income, labelled surplus2, which does not
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include the income of the unemployed, that is,
surplus2 = surplus1  uNHbH   uNL bL:
4.1 Calibration
One period in the model represents one month, so all the parameters are interpreted
monthly. Also, we dene as immigrantsnon-citizens and naturalized citizens. Finally,
a skilled worker is one with at least a Bachelors degree.
Based on the seminal work of Blanchard and Diamond (1991), we use Cobb-Douglas
matching functions in each of the two labor markets; more specically, the matching
functions are MH = AH(uNH + u
I
H + e
I
HL)
v1 H in the skilled market and ML = AL(u
N
L +
uIL + u
I
H)
v1 L in the unskilled market, where the scale parameters Ai, i = H;L, index
the e¢ ciency of each of the two matching processes.
There are 20 parameters needed to be determined: the monthly interest rate r, the
unemployment elasticity of the matching function , the matching e¢ ciency parameters
AH and AL; the workersbargaining power , the share of native skilled labor force , the
numbers of skilled and unskilled immigrants IH and IL, the monthly separation rates sH
and sL, the vacancy costs cH and cL, the search cost parameters  and hI ; the productivity
parameters yL; yH and , the unemployment ow incomes bH and bL; and the parameter
 that captures the transferability of human capital across borders.
First, for the monthly interest rate we use the commonly-used value of 0:004. This is
the monthly rate that corresponds to an annual real interest rate of 4:76%, calculated as
the di¤erence between the 30-year treasury constant maturity bond rate and the average
GDP deator over the period 1990-1999 (the data are from the Federal Reserve Bank
of Saint Louis). Second, following the literature we set the unemployment elasticity of
the matching function () and the workersbargaining power parameter () equal to 0:5.
Third, following the estimates of Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014) for the U.S. economy,
the percentage of US-born workers with a Bachelors degree () is set to 0:274, the monthly
skilled and unskilled separation rates are sH = 0:019 and sL = 0:034, and the normalized
numbers, i.e., the raw numbers divided by the native labor force, of skilled and unskilled
immigrants are set to IH = 0:036 and IL = 0:089. Fourth, the productivity of unskilled
workers (yL) is normalized to 1. Fifth, in the main text, we use the value of  = 1:00
for the relative productivity of high-skilled workers in low-skill jobs, i.e., high-skilled and
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
Value Interpretation
r = 0:004 Monthly real interest rate.
 = 0:5 Unemployment elasticity of the matching function.
 = 0:5 Workersbargaining power.
 = 0:274 Share of native skilled labor force.
IH = 0:036; IL = 0:089 Normalized number of skilled and unskilled immigrants.
sH = 0:019; sL = 0:034 Monthly skilled and unskilled separation rates.
yL = 1 Normalized productivity of low-skilled workers.
 = 0:5 Relative search cost of mismatched workers
 = 1:00 Relative productivity of high-skilled workers in low-skill jobs
low-skilled workers are equally productive in low-skill jobs. Nevertheless, we provide a
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter, which is presented in Appendix A.2.1.
Finally, we assume that  = 0:5, but we have also conducted sensitivity analysis with
respect to this parameter as well (see Appendix A.2.3). Table 1 summarizes these 11
parameter values.
The remaining 9 parameters are jointly calibrated to match the following 9 calibration
targets obtained from the U.S. data over the period of interest:15 a) the average employ-
ment rates of workers with at least a Bachelors degree and of workers with less than a
Bachelors degree are 0:976 and 0:939, respectively; b) the college-plus wage premium is
61:1%; c) the native-immigrant wage gap is 0:19; d) the vacancy to unemployment ratios
are equal to 0:620; e) the replacement ratios (ratio of unemployment to employment in-
come) are set to 0:50; a value that is between Hall and Milgroms estimate of 0:71 (Hall
and Milgrom, 2008) and Shimers estimate of 0:40 (Shimer 2005) (we have also computed
the results using the alternative value of 0:71 in Appendix A.2.2); and f) the overed-
ucation ratio for high-skilled immigrants is 0:2.16 The calibrated parameter values are
presented in Table 2.
15We borrow the targets a)-d) from Chassamboulli and Palivos (2014), where one can nd detailed
explanations on how they are computed.
16Beckhusen et al. (2013) estimate that the overeducation ratio exceeds 40 percent for immigrants with
a bachelors degree, 50 percent for those with a doctoral/professional degree, and 75 percent for those
with a masters degree. For comparable natives, the overeducation ratio is between 10 to 20 percentage
points lower. Given that, in our model, natives are not overeducated, we set the overeducation ratio for
immigrants to 20 percent.
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Table 2: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
cL = 1:189; cH = 3:590 Vacancy costs
AL = 0:665, AH = 1:463 Matching e¢ ciency parameters
hI = 2:878 Search cost
yH = 1:579 Relative productivity of high-skilled workers
bL = 0:484; bH = 0:779 Unemployment ow incomes
 = 0:077 Transferability of foreign human capital
4.2 Results
As in Section 3, we perform three basic exercises; specically, we analyze the e¤ects on
native workers of: a) cross-skill matching (we examined this theoretically in Proposition
3), b) an increase in immigration (see Proposition 4), and c) an improvement in the trans-
ferability of foreign human capital (see subsection 3.3). In these exercises, the restrictions
on the parameters mentioned above and in Appendix A.1.1 hold, except, of course for
the case where we change the parameter values to obtain the ex post segmentation (no
cross-skill matching) equilibrium.
4.2.1 Cross-skill matching
In Table 3, we present the results from going from the ex post segmentation equilibrium
(no cross-skill matching) to the cross-skill matching equilibrium. In the latter equilibrium,
skilled immigrants accept both skilled and unskilled jobs. To obtain the case where there
is no cross-skill matching, we change the parameters  and  so that yL = bH  (1 )hI
and in equilibrium skilled immigrants refuse to take low-skill jobs. All the parameters
that concern the native workers remain the same; changes that a¤ect them occur only
through the tightness measures L and H . In agreement with Proposition 3a, high-skill
workers lose from cross-skill matching, both in terms of employment and wages. Whereas
the e¤ect on wages is rather small, there is a sizeable impact on unemployment. This
is so, because cross-skill matching raises the outside option of high-skilled immigrants,
which increases their wage and discourages job entry. However, low-skilled native workers
experience a small gain from cross-skill matching. This occurs because according to our
parameterization high-skilled immigrants have a lower outside option than low-skilled
natives (bH   (1  )hI < bL); and hence the tightness in the low-skill market L goes up.
The search cost while unemployed is so high for skilled immigrants that they prefer to get
an unskilled job even at a very low wage and continue to search in the high-skill sector.
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Table 3 presents also the e¤ects on immigrants. As expected, low-skilled immigrants gain
because of the increase in the tightness L, whereas high-skilled workers gain because
cross-skill matching gives them more options.
Table 3: The E¤ects of Cross-skill Matching
From No Cross-skill Matching to Cross-skill Matching
Value % Change
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:03
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:82
Labor Market Tightness (L) 1:76
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:21
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 19:52
Labor Market Tightness (H)  30:52
Overall Natives
Wage  0:11
Unemployment Rate 3:79
Surplus1  0:04
Surplus2  0:09
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:21
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:82
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 19:05
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  3:81
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 12:47
Unemployment Rate  81:80
Overall Immigrants
Wage 4:65
Unemployment Rate  51:13
Finally, Table A.7 in Appendix A.2.2 presents the results for the case where the re-
placement ratio is 0:71; as estimated in Hall and Milgrom (2008). As can be seen, the
di¤erences are qualitatively in the same direction and quantitatively small.
4.2.2 An increase in immigration
We analyze the e¤ects of the low-skill and high-skill immigration inux that took place
in the U.S. during the decade 2000-2009. The normalized changes in IL and IH over the
period 2000-2009, calculated using the Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) of the 1990
and 2000 US Census, are 0:051 and 0:026; respectively, that is, 5:1 and 2:6 percent of the
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native labor force.17
In Table 4, we summarize the e¤ects of immigration on the native skilled and unskilled
workers. More specically, we consider rst a change in unskilled immigration only, which
is of the same magnitude as the one found in the data, i.e., IL = 0:051 (second column in
Table 4). Next, we consider a change in skilled immigration equal to IH = 0:026 (third
column) and nally we analyze the e¤ects of an immigration inux that is of the same
magnitude and composition as the one in the data, i.e., IL = 0:051 and IH = 0:026:
Table 4: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:24 0:02 0:25
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  7:74  0:52  8:03
Labor Market Tightness (L) 18:65 1:12 19:45
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:01 0:06 0:05
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:50  4:37  3:82
Labor Market Tightness (H)  1:02 9:57 8:30
Overall Natives
Wage 0:09 0:04 0:13
Unemployment Rate  5:52  1:55  6:90
Surplus1 0:96 0:33 1:26
Surplus2 1:13 0:37 1:47
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 1:98 0:13 2:06
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  7:74  0:52  8:03
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:43 1:15 1:54
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:12 1:03 0:90
Wage (wIHL) 1:90  0:51 1:37
Over-Education Ratio 1:50  3:91  2:40
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:57 1:13 1:65
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  6:89  1:47  8:05
Overall Immigrants
Wage  0:58 3:79 2:40
Unemployment Rate  0:74  10:60  8:53
As seen in Table 4, an increase in unskilled immigration raises the wage of low-skilled
native workers and lowers their unemployment rate, while it has the opposite e¤ects on
high-skilled native workers. As explained in Proposition 4, this occurs because an increase
17Notice that IH=(IL + IH) = 0:338 >  = 0:274, i.e., the new immigration ow was college intensive.
In fact, this pattern appears in virtually all OECD countries (see Docquier, Ozden and Peri, 2014).
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in the number of unskilled immigrants reduces the labor cost that a low-skill rm expects
to pay. On the other hand, it raises the outside option of mismatched workers (it is easier
for them to nd a low-skill job) and hence it increases the labor cost that a high-skill rm
expects to pay. Consequently, the increase in unskilled immigration induces entry in the
low-skill and exit in the high-skill sector. Put di¤erently, the market tightness goes up in
the rst and down in the second sector. Note that these results are opposite from what
one obtains in a competitive model, which is to see factors that are similar to unskilled
immigration to lose and factors that are di¤erent to gain. The underlying sources of those
e¤ects are a constant returns to scale production function and a competitive labor market,
which imply diminishing marginal products as the number of unskilled workers increases,
their marginal product and hence their wage decreasesand factor complementarity as
the number of unskilled workers increases, the marginal product and hence the wage of
skilled workers increases. On the contrary, in the present model, it is the higher search cost
of the low-skilled immigrants that drives the gain of unskilled natives and the possibility
of cross-skill matching that leads to the loss of high-skilled natives. In Proposition 4,
we showed even analytically these results for the case where  = 1: Nevertheless, our
simulation exercise conrms that this is the case even for higher values of  (Tables A.1
and A.4 in Appendix A.2.1 present the results for the case where  = 1:2; in Table A.1
we change the value of ; but keep all other parameter values the same, while in Table
A.4 we set the value of the relative productivity parameter  = 1:2 and then recalibrate
the model to match all targets).18
Consider next an increase in the number of skilled immigrants. As shown in Proposi-
tion 4, this leads to an increase in the wage and a decrease in the unemployment rate of
high-skilled native workers. This is so because the induced entry increases the number of
jobs per worker H : On the other hand, the e¤ect on L is in general ambiguous, since the
increase in H has two conicting e¤ects: rst, it decreases the number of unemployed
high skilled immigrants and tends to raise L and second, it raises the separation rate
between low-skill jobs and skilled immigrants, which induces rm exit and leads to a
lower L: Nevertheless, as shown in Table 4 (third column), the rst e¤ect dominates and
the overall result is positive (although small) on low-skilled workers. Furthermore, these
results are robust to alternative values of  (as above, Tables A.1 and A.4 in Appendix
18Although we have experimented with di¤erent values of ; we have always maintain the (reasonable)
restriction that yL < yH : For higher values of ; skilled immigrants may not be willing to work in the
skilled sector.
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A.2.1 present the results for the cases where  = 1:20):
Finally, the last column in Table 4 presents the case where both skilled and unskilled
immigration take place at the same time. The net result is an increase in the wages of
both skilled and unskilled natives and a decrease in their unemployment rates. In the
Appendix, we also examine the sensitivity of the results with respect to the replacement
ratio (in Table A.8 in Appendix A.2.2 we raise the replacement ratio to 0:71) as well as
with respect to the relative search cost parameter for mismatched workers  (Table A.10
in Appendix A.2.3 presents the case where we change the value of  from 0:5 to 0:75; but
keep all other parameter values the same, while Table A.13 presents the case where we set
the value of  = 0:75 and then recalibrate the model to match all targets). In general, the
di¤erences between these Tables are qualitatively in the same direction and quantitatively
small. There is only one small di¤erence. The impact of skilled immigration is positive
on low-skilled native workers in Table 4 and negative in Tables A.10 and A.13. This is so
because the higher search cost results in a lower wage rate wIHH for high skilled immigrants
(their outside option is lower and their bargaining position weakens). This means that,
following an increase in skilled immigration, the matching rate in the high-skill sector and
hence the separation rate between low-skill rms and high-skilled immigrants is higher;
hence, there is exit in the low-skill sector, a drop in L; with a concomitant decrease in
wNLL and an increase in u
N
LL:
4.2.3 Transferability of Human Capital
Our nal exercise simulates the e¤ects of an improvement in the transferability of hu-
man capital across borders. As mentioned above, this can be achieved through the es-
tablishment of programs that enhance occupation-specic language prociency, training
programs regarding licensing requirements and workplace norms and practices in the host
county, foreign educational credentials and work experience evaluation agencies, etc.
Table 5 presents the results. In all cases, we consider a change in  starting from
 = 0:077 (overeducation ratio for high-skilled immigrants 20%). The new values of 
that we consider are (overeducation ratios in parentheses): 0:06 (25:7%), 0:10 (15:3%),
0:20 (7:1%) and 0:80 (1:3%).19 As can be seen in Table 5, if, starting from an overeducation
ratio of twenty percent,  increases (decreases) then the low-skilled native workers lose
19We present the results for values above and below the benchmark value of 0:077 to demonstrate the
monotonicity of the e¤ects.
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(gain) both in terms of wages and employment. This is so, because, for example, an
increase in  raises the separation rate between high-skilled workers and low-skill jobs,
which discourages entry in the low-skill sector (L decreases) and makes it more di¢ cult
for low-skilled workers to nd employment. As a result, their wage goes down and their
unemployment rate increases.
On the other hand, an increase in  initially raises the wage and employment of high-
skilled workers; an increase in  raises the probability that a match between a skilled
immigrant and a skilled position will be consummated, which, given that under the par-
ticular parameterization wIHH < w
N
HH ; induces entry in the high skill sector (H increases)
and improves the bargaining position of workers.20 Interestingly, however, after a point,
as  increases and the wage rates of skilled natives and immigrants increase, the expected
prot NHH
N
HH +(1 NHH)IHH starts declining. In other words, the additional cost to
the rm owing to the higher wages that it has to pay outweigh the benet of the increase in
: As a result, the initial ow direction reverses and there is now exit of high-skill positions
(H decreases). This lowers the wage of skilled workers and raises their unemployment
rate (the maximum of the prot occurs around  = 0:18; on the other hand, starting from
 = 0:077; any change that leads to a value of  > 0:55 will decrease H): In sum, the
behavior of the employment and unemployment rates (eNHH= and u
N
H=), the tightness
measure and the matching rate (H and m(H)) and the wage rate of high-skilled native
workers (wNHH) is not monotonic.
Table 5 presents also the overall results for natives (in terms of wages and unemploy-
ment) as well as the two measures of the surplus (surplus1 and surplus2, where it may be
recalled that the second measure does not include the -imputed- unemployment income).
The overall results are initially positive in terms of wages and employment, whereas the
change in surplus1 (surplus2) is negative (positive). Thus, initially an improvement in
the transferability of human capital benets the high-skilled and hurts the low-skilled na-
tives; moreover, the net e¤ects are either positive or negative, depending on the measure
of the surplus used. Nevertheless, at high values of  (small overeducation ratios), further
improvements in the transferability make both types of native workers worse o¤ in terms
of wages and employment and decrease the net income of the economy.
The e¤ects on immigrants are also presented in Table 5. The decline in the wage and
20Recall that in principle wIHH could be higher or lower than w
N
HH : The parameter values that we use
imply wIHH < w
N
HH :
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the employment rate of low-skilled immigrants follows directly from the change in the
relevant matching rate m(L): As regards the skilled immigrants, there are two e¤ects on
their matching rate m(H): one owing to the change in  and one owing to the change
in H : For high values of the overeducation ratio (low values of ), when an increase in 
raises H ; both e¤ects are positive on the wage and the employment rate. On the other
hand, for low values of the overeducation ratio (high values of ); when an increase in 
lowers H ; the e¤ect of the increase in  is positive, whereas the e¤ect from the decrease
in H is negative. Nevertheless, the former e¤ect dominates; that is why the wage rate
(wIHH) and the employment rate (e
I
HH=IH) for skilled immigrants continue to increase.
Table 5: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:80
Overeducation Ratio (%) 25:7 15:3 7:1 1:3
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:00  0:01  0:02  0:03
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:16 0:16 0:57 1:04
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:34  0:34  1:20  2:17
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:06 0:04 0:08  0:05
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 4:66  3:20  5:80 3:57
Labor Market Tightness (H)  8:91 6:89 13:01  6:93
Overall Natives
Wage  0:03 0:02 0:04  0:04
Unemployment Rate 1:14  0:74  1:14 1:72
Surplus1  0:00  0:02  0:12  0:38
Surplus2  0:02  0:01  0:11  0:42
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:04  0:04  0:15  0:26
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:16 0:16 0:57 1:04
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  7:34 6:95 21:96 38:80
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  7:39 6:15 17:06 25:94
Wage (wIHL) 3:74  4:42  18:51  47:93
Overeducation Ratio 28:66  23:59  64:34  93:63
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  6:71 7:09 24:34 45:55
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
) 6:50  6:30  22:41  54:82
Overall Immigrants
Wage  2:31 2:45 8:43 15:95
Unemployment Rate 0:50  0:46  1:56  4:24
Finally, Tables A.2 and A.5 in Appendix A.2.1 present the results of the exercise for
a value of the relative productivity parameter equal to  = 1:2; Table A.9 in Appendix
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A.2.2 for a replacement ratio 0f 0:71 and Tables A.11 and A.14 in Appendix A.2.3 for a
value of the relative search cost parameter  = 0:75: In all cases, the results are robust.
5 Conclusions
The overeducation of immigrants is a prominent feature in labor markets. In this paper,
we investigate how this phenomenon a¤ects the labor market outcomes in the host country.
We do so for an economy in which frictions in the labor market generate unemployment
and wages are not competitively determined but are instead the outcome of bilateral bar-
gaining between workers and rms. There are also several other features in our model.
First, there exists skill heterogeneity among native and immigrant workers, which allows
for the study of the distributional e¤ects across various groups of the labor force; namely,
unskilled and skilled native workers experience di¤erent e¤ects from immigration ows and
related economic policies. Second, there is di¤erential search cost between natives and
immigrants, which generates an equilibrium wage gap between equally productive work-
ers; that is, immigrants of a certain skill receive a lower wage than equally productive
natives. This makes them more attractive to a rm. As a consequence, any immigration
movement will a¤ect the rmsincentives to create new vacancies. Third, there is imper-
fect transferability of human capital across borders, which puts skilled immigrants at a
disadvantage relative to skilled natives. This and the possibility of cross-skill matching
makes skilled immigrants willing to accept low-skill jobs, leading to overeducation and
more generally qualication mismatches. Finally, there is on-the-job search on behalf of
mismatched workers, which makes these skill mismatches transitory.
We calibrate the model to the US economy and assess quantitatively the impact of
three changes. First, we analyze the e¤ects of a movement from a segmentation equilib-
rium, where there is no cross-skill matching, to a cross-skill matching equilibrium. We
nd that cross-skill matching benets the unskilled and hurts the skilled native workers.
Similarly, new unskilled immigration benets the low-skilled native workers and hurts
the high-skilled. On the other hand, new skilled immigration benets both skilled and
unskilled natives. Moreover, when we simulate the e¤ects of the actual US immigra-
tion inux that took place between the years 2000 and 2009, we nd that both skilled
and unskilled native workers gain. We also nd that initially an improvement in the
transferability of human capital benets the high-skilled natives at the expense of the
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low-skilled. Nevertheless, below a certain overeducation ratio, further improvements in
the transferability of human capital make both types of native workers worse o¤.
We believe that our framework can be extended in a number of di¤erent ways. For
example, the percentage of skilled native workers is taken as given in our model. A natural
extension would be to allow for endogenous skill acquisition on behalf of native workers
and study how this decision is inuenced by the presence of overeducated immigrants. The
key determinant factor for the education decision is the future return to human capital. It
would be interesting to study how this return responds to the immigration of new human
capital or to policies that improve its transferability.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
A.1.1 Restrictions on Parameter Values
To ensure that all types of workers are employed, all surpluses must be positive. Given
the Nash sharing rule this requires that all ij are positive. For 
N
LL > 0; it is necessary
and su¢ cient to assume that yL > bL; similarly, NHH > 0; i¤ yH > bH and 
I
HL > 0 i¤
yL > bH (1  )hI : Given that ILL > NLL, yL > bL implies also that ILL > 0: Finally,
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the employability of high-skilled immigrants (EHSI)
in high-skill jobs, i.e., IHH > 0; is
yH > bH   hI + m(L)
	(L) + m(H)
fyL   [bH   (1  )hI ]g: (Condition for EHSI)
The Condition for EHSI implies that the output from a match between a skilled immigrant
and a skilled vacancy exceeds the workers outside option.
The assumption that yL > bL guarantees also that NLL > VL = 0: Thus, a rm that
meets an unskilled native worker will form an employment relation and will not decide
to wait for an unskilled immigrant, despite the fact that the latter is willing to accept a
lower wage. Moreover, the assumption yL > bH   (1  )hI guarantees the existence
of cross-skill matching, since it implies that IHL = [(1   )=](EIHL   U IH) > 0 = VL:
Hence, a low-skill position that meets a high-skilled worker prefers to form a match rather
than stay vacant and a high-skilled worker who meets a vacant low-skill position prefers
to form a match rather than stay unemployed (EIHL > U
I
H). Finally, the existence of
on-the-job (OTJ) search on behalf of skilled immigrants requires EIHH > E
I
HL: Given the
Nash sharing rule, equations (1) and (2) imply that the following condition must hold
yH > bH   hI + r + sH + m(H) + m(L)
	(L) + m(H)
fyL   [bH   (1  )hI ]g:
(Condition for OTJ search)
Notice that the Condition for OTJ search is su¢ cient for the Condition for EHSI to hold.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that 
H = sH+mHsH+mH and 
L =
sH(sL+mH)(sL+mL)
sL(sH+mH)(sL+mL+mH)
; where to avoid notation
clutter, we let 	j = 	(j) = r + sj + mj; j = H;L; mj = m(j); m
0
j = m
0
(j), and
1    + IL + IH
L = N: We denote also the right-hand side of equations (19) and (20)
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as RHSH and RHSL, respectively. Di¤erentiating RHSH and RHSL with respect to H
and L leads to
@RHSH
@H
=
(1  )m0H
+ IH
H

  (yH   bH)
	H

(1  ) IHsH
(+ IH
H) (sH + mH)
2 +

	H

+IH
"
yH   bH + hI  
mL

yL   bH + (1  )hI

	L + mH
#
 (1  ) sH (r + sH + mH)  
H (+ IH
H) (sH + mH)2
(+ IH
H) (sH + mH)
2 (r + sH + mH)
2
+
2IH
HmL

yL   bH + (1  )hI

(r + sH + mH) (	L + mH)
2
)
;
@RHSH
@L
=  (1  ) IH
H (r + sL + mH)

yL   bH + (1  )hI

(+ IH
H) (r + sH + mH) (	L + mH)
2 m
0
L < 0;
@RHSL
@H
=
@
L
@H
IH (1  )
N2
"
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
  (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L
#
 (1  ) IH
L

yL   bH + (1  )hI

m0H
N (	L + mH)
2
=
(   1) IH
Lm0H
N
(

N
"
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
 (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L

+
yL   bH + (1  )hI
(	L + mH)
2

;
and
@RHSL
@L
=
@
L
@L
(1  ) IH
N2
"
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
  (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L
#
 (1  ) m
0
L
N
"
(1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILhI
	2L
+

yL   bH + (1  )hI

IH
L
(	L + mH)
2
#
;
where  = (sL sH)(sL+mL+mH)
2+mL(sH+mH)
2
(sL+mH)(sL sH+mL)(sH+mH)(sL+mL+mH) ;
@
L
@L
=
sH(sL+mH)mHm
0
L
sL(sH+mH)(sL+mL+mH)
2 > 0.
Since the left-hand side of equation (19) (LHSH) increases in H , a su¢ cient condition
for the existence of solution to H ; given L; is @RHSH@H < 0,
cH
q(0)
 RHSH jH=0 and cHq(+1) 
RHSH jH=+1. Moreover, @RHSH@L < 0 implies
@H
@L
< 0 in equation (19). In addition, since
q0 () < 0, q (0) = +1, q (+1) = 0, m0 () > 0, m (0) = 0 and m (+1) = +1, the
conditions cH
q(0)
 RHSH jH=0 and cHq(+1)  RHSH jH=+1 always hold and the solution to
H given L satises H (L) 2
 
H ; H

, where 0  H < H < +1.
34
Similarly, since the left-hand side of equation (20) (LHSL) increases in L, a su¢ cient
condition for the existence of solution to L given H is @RHSL@L < 0,
cL
q(0)
 RHSLjL=0
and cL
q(+1)  RHSLjL=+1. Moreover, if @RHSL@H > 0 then
@L
@H
> 0 in equation (20).
In addition, since q0 () < 0, q (0) = +1, q (+1) = 0, m0 () > 0, m (0) = 0 and
m (+1) = +1, the conditions cL
q(0)
 RHSLjL=0 and cLq(+1)  RHSLjL=+1 always hold
and the solution to L; given H ; satises L (H) 2

L; L

, where 0  L < L < +1.
Thus, if we impose the above conditions on parameters, the H-L curve described by
equation (19) decreases in L; whereas the one described by equation (20) increases; it
follows that they intersect once. Hence, the steady-state equilibrium exists and is unique.
The above conditions imply
  (yH   bH)
	H

(1  ) IHsH
(+ IH
H) (sH + mH)
2 +

	H

+IH
"
yH   bH + hI  
mL

yL   bH + (1  )hI

	L + mH
#
 (1  ) sH (r + sH + mH)  
H (+ IH
H) (sH + mH)2
(+ IH
H) (sH + mH)
2 (r + sH + mH)
2
+
2IH
HmL

yL   bH + (1  )hI

(r + sH + mH) (	L + mH)
2
)
< 0;
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
  (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L
< 0;

N
"
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
  (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L
#
+
yL   bH + (1  )hI
(	L + mH)
2 < 0:
After some tedious algebra, we nally get the following su¢ cient conditions:
IH
 
yH   bH + hI
  (1  ) (r + sH)
(+ IH) sH
  2

+

yL   bH + (1  )hI
  
1 + 2

<  (yH   bH)min (; ) ;
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
(1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILhI < 1;

1  + IL + IH
"
(1  + IL)

yL   bH + (1  )hI   (yL   bL)
  ILhI
r + sL
#
+
yL   bH
r + sL
< 0;
where  = sL sH
(sL+ mH)(sH+ mH)
, mH = mH
 
H

and H is the solution to
cH
q (H)
=
1  
+ IH
H

 (yH   bH)
	H
+
IH
H
r + sH + mH

yH   bH + hI

:
It is clear that for su¢ ciently large hI ,  and , the above inequalities can all hold. Under
the above three parameter restrictions, there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium.
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A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 2
a) The e¤ects on wNHH ; w
N
LL; w
I
LL and w
I
HL follow immediately upon di¤erentiation of (13),
(14) and (15). Moreover, di¤erentiating (16) yields
dwIHH
dH
=
(1  )m0H(r + sH)
(r + sH + mH)
2

yH   bH + hI
 mL (	L + mH) + r + sH + mH
(	L + mH)
2

yL   bH + (1  )hI

which can take either sign. Finally, the e¤ect of L on wIHH follows immediately after
di¤erentiating (16).
b) The results follow after di¤erentiating equations (17). In particular,
duIH
dH
=
IHsHm
0
H [mL (sH   sL)  (sL + mH)2]
(sH + mH)
2 (sL +mL + mH)
2 < 0 if sH < sL:
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 3
a) Given that lower H leads to a lower wage wNHH and higher unemployment rate, u
N
H=;
(see Proposition 2), it su¢ ces to show that in the cross-skill matching equilibrium the
value of H is lower than the one in the ex post segmentation equilibrium. In the latter
equilibrium, the equation that sets the average cost of a high-skilled position equal to the
value of the prot expected from such a position is
cH
qH
=
1  
+ IH
H

(yH   bH)
	H
+
IH
H(yH   bH + hI)
r + sH + mH

: (A.1)
This follows simply by setting yL = bH   (1  )hI in equation (19). Denote the values
of H and L that satisfy equation equation (A.1) as 
NCSM
H and 
NCSM
L ; and denote the
solutions when there is cross-skill matching as CSMH and 
CSM
L ((N)CSM stands for (no)
cross-skill matching). From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that NCSMH = H >
CSMH .
b) In the ex post segmentation equilibrium the equation that replaces (20) is
	(L)
q(L)
jNCSM = 1  
cL

yL   bL + ILh
I
1  + IL

: (A.2)
Note that, unlike what we did in case a) above, one cannot just set yL = bH   (1  )hI
in equation (20); one should also take into account that in the ex post segmentation
equilibrium, where there is no cross-skill matching, there is also no on-the-job search by
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mismatched workers. Hence, to obtain (A.2), one should substitute equations (1) and the
free-entry condition (equation 11) in (4). Next, if  = 1, we have that
	L
qL
jCSM = 1  
cL(1  + IL + IH
L)

(1  + IL)(yL   bL) + ILhI
+
IH
L

yL   bH + (1  )hI

	L
	L + mH
)
<
1  
cL
"
yL   bL + ILh
I
1  + IL  
IH
L

bH   (1  )hI   bL

1  + IL + IH
L
#
:
If bH   (1  )hI > bL, we have
	(L)
q(L)
jCSM < 	(L)
q(L)
jNCSM :
Since 	(L)=q(L) is increasing in L, the result follows.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 4
a) Di¤erentiating equations (19) and (20) we get24 @RHSH@H + cHq0(H)q2(H) @RHSH@L
@RHSL
@H
@RHSL
@L
+ cLq
0(L)
q2(L)
35" dHdIL
dL
dIL
#
=
"  @RHSH
@IL
 @RHSL
@IL
#
(A.3)
where
@RHSH
@IL
= 0;
@RHSL
@IL
=
1  
N2

IH
L (yL   bL) + (1  + IH
L)hI
	L
 IH
L[yL   bH + (1  )h
I ]
	L + mH

>
(1  )hI
N2	L

1  + IH
L   IH
LIL
1  + IL

> 0:
Recall from the proof of Proposition 1 that @RHSH
@L
< 0. Assume also that @RHSH
@H
< 0,
@RHSL
@H
> 0, @RHSL
@L
< 0 to ensure existence and uniqueness of a steady-state equilibrium
(see the proof of Proposition 1). It follows then that the determinant of the coe¢ cient
matrix in (A.3) is positive. Hence, applying Crammers rule we get that dH
dIL
< 0 and
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dL
dIL
> 0: The rest of the proposition, i.e., the fact that low-skilled natives benet and
high-skilled lose, follows from Proposition 2.
b) Di¤erentiating equations (19) and (20) we get24 @RHSH@H + cHq0(H)q2(H) @RHSH@L
@RHSL
@H
@RHSL
@L
+ cLq
0(L)
q2(L)
35" dHdIH
dL
dIH
#
=
"  @RHSH
@IH
 @RHSL
@IH
#
(A.4)
where
@RHSH
@IH
=
(1  )
H
(+ IH
H)
2


r + sH + mH

yH   bH + hI
 mL

yL   bH + (1  )hI

	L + mH
#
  yH   bH
	H
)
@RHSL
@IH
=
(1  ) 
L
N2
(
yL   bH + (1  )hI

(1  + IL)
	L + mH
 (1  + IL) (yL   bL) + ILh
I
	L

;
Under the same assumptions as in part a), the determinant of the coe¢ cient matrix is
positive. If  ! 1 and hI   mL[yL bH+(1 )h
I]
	L+mH
> 0, we get @RHSH
@IH
> 0. If  ! 0, we
get @RHSH
@IH
< 0. Moreover, if  = 1, we have @RHSL
@IH
< 0: Hence, applying Crammers rule
we get that if  ! 1;  = 1 and hI   mL[yL bH+(1 )h
I]
	L+mH
> 0, dH
dIH
> 0, while dL
dIH
has an
ambiguous sign. If  ! 0, we get dL
dIH
< 0 and dH
dIH
has once again an ambiguous sign.
A.2 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we perform sensitivity analysis with respect to the parameter values of the
relativity productivity ; the replacement ratio, which is equal to bH=wNHH = bL=w
N
LL; and
the relative search cost faced by mismatched workers, :We present the case where there
is a change just in one parameter value, and all others remain the same, as well as the
case where, after changing one parameter value, the model is recalibrated to match all
targets.21
21For the cases where we analyze the sensitivity with respect to  and ; we do not re-examine the
e¤ects of cross-skill matching. We do this because, as explained in the main text, to get the ex post
segmentation equilibrium we change  and  so that yL = bH   (1  )hI : Further changes then in  or
 do not alter the equilibrium. Also, for the case where we examine the sensitivity with respect to the
replacement ratio, we look only at the case where the model is recalibrated to match all targets. We do
this, because a change in the replacement ratio triggers a change in more than one parameter, namely, a
change in both bH and bL:
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A.2.1 Relative Productivity
In Tables A.1 and A.2 we present the results for the case where we change the value for
the relative productivity parameter  but keep all other parameter values the same. Table
A.1 below presents the results after a) a change in unskilled immigration only, which is
of the same magnitude as the one found in the data, i.e., IL = 0:051 (second column in
Table A.1) b) a change in skilled immigration equal to IH = 0:026 (third column) and
nally c) an immigration inux that is of the same magnitude and composition as the one
in the data, i.e., IL = 0:051 and IH = 0:026 (last column). Notice that the di¤erences
between Tables 4, in the main text, and A.1 are qualitatively in the same direction and
quantitatively small.
Table A.1: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
 = 1:2
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:24 0:05 0:26
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  7:69  0:70  8:11
Labor Market Tightness (L) 18:53 1:50 19:69
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:01 0:02 0:04
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:58  3:96  3:32
Labor Market Tightness (H)  1:17 8:61 7:15
Overall Natives
Wage 0:09 0:04 0:13
Unemployment Rate  5:42  1:59  6:80
Surplus1 0:95 0:34 1:26
Surplus2 1:12 0:37 1:46
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 1:97 0:18 2:07
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  7:69  0:70  8:11
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:48 0:95 1:38
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:14 0:95 0:80
Wage (wIHL) 1:71  0:36 1:33
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 1:53  3:48  1:92
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:67 0:81 1:43
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  6:86  1:52  8:04
Overall Immigrants
Wage  1:07 4:36 2:42
Unemployment Rate  0:72  10:67  8:58
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Table A.2 presents the results from an improvement in the transferability of foreign
human capital. As in the main text, in all cases, the initial situation is a value of  = 0:077
(overeducation ratio for high-skilled immigrants 20:5 percent).22 The di¤erences between
Tables 5 and A.2 are qualitatively in the same direction and quantitatively small.
Table A.2: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:80
Overeducation Ratio (%) 25:2 15:6 7:3 1:3
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:01  0:01  0:02  0:04
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:19 0:19 0:68 1:26
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:40  0:41  1:42  2:64
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:07 0:05 0:09  0:02
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 4:96  3:51  6:92 1:23
Labor Market Tightness (H)  9:44 7:61 15:80  2:47
Overall Natives
Wage  0:04 0:03 0:04  0:03
Unemployment Rate 1:23  0:83  1:41 1:25
Surplus1  0:01  0:01  0:11  0:37
Surplus2  0:03  0:00  0:10  0:41
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:05  0:05  0:17  0:32
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:19 0:19 0:68 1:26
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  6:59 6:29 20:07 35:87
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  7:61 6:35 17:62 26:72
Wage (wIHL) 3:38  4:01  16:93  44:01
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 28:67  23:67  64:58  93:75
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  6:59 6:29 19:80 38:45
Unemployment Rate 6:49  6:31  22:43  54:90
Overall Immigrants
Wage  1:76 5:54 7:08 13:91
Unemployment Rate 0:49  0:44  1:49  4:10
Next we present the case where we set the value of the relative productivity parameter
 = 1:2 and then recalibrate the model to match all targets. Table A.3 presents the new
parameter values (only the values of cH , cL; and hI change).
22When  changes from 1:0 to 1:2 and  remains 0:0739; the overeducation changes from 20 to 20:5%
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Table A.3: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
cL = 1:229; cH = 3:578 Vacancy costs
AL = 0:665, AH = 1:463 Matching e¢ ciency parameters
hI = 3:084 Search cost
yH = 1:579 Relative productivity of high-skilled workers
bL = 0:484; bH = 0:779 Unemployment ow incomes
 = 0:077 Transferability of foreign human capital
Table A.4 presents the e¤ects of a change in immigration equal to that found in the
data. The di¤erences between Tables 4, A.1 and A.4 are qualitatively in the same direction
and quantitatively small.
Table A.4: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:25 0:02 0:27
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  7:98  0:72  8:42
Labor Market Tightness (L) 19:32 1:55 20:54
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:01 0:06 0:05
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:62  4:36  3:68
Labor Market Tightness (H)  1:25 9:53 7:97
Overall Natives
Wage 0:10 0:04 0:13
Unemployment Rate  5:68  1:70  7:15
Surplus1 1:01 0:35 1:33
Surplus2 1:19 0:39 1:55
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 2:20 0:20 2:33
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  7:98  0:72  8:42
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:53 1:12 1:60
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:14 1:03 0:87
Wage (wIHL) 1:94  0:45 1:46
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 1:64  3:87  2:21
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:74 0:96 1:64
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  7:09  1:64  8:37
Overall Immigrants
Wage  0:86 4:42 2:66
Unemployment Rate  0:98  10:75  8:86
Table A.5 presents the e¤ects from a change in the transferability of foreign human
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capital. The initial state is the one where  = 0:077 (overeducation ratio for high-skilled
immigrants 20%). The di¤erences between Tables 5, A.2 and A.5 are qualitatively in the
same direction and quantitatively small.
Table A.5: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:60
Overeducation Ratio (%) 25:8 15:2 7:1 1:3
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:01  0:01  0:02  0:04
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:19 0:20 0:70 1:30
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:41  0:42  1:47  2:71
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:06 0:04 0:08  0:03
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 4:88  3:42  6:48 2:59
Labor Market Tightness (H)  9:30 7:37 14:67  5:10
Overall Natives
Wage  0:03 0:02 0:04  0:04
Unemployment Rate 1:17  0:77  1:22 1:65
Surplus1  0:00  0:02  0:13  0:40
Surplus2  0:02  0:01  0:11  0:45
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:05  0:05  0:19  0:36
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:19 0:20 0:70 1:30
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  7:08 6:74 21:41 38:17
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  7:45 6:19 17:14 25:98
Wage (wIHL) 3:70  4:38  18:36  47:28
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 28:88  23:75  64:66  93:73
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  5:31 5:90 20:99 40:66
Unemployment Rate 6:51  6:32  22:51  55:01
Overall Immigrants
Wage  1:88 2:09 7:49 14:67
Unemployment Rate 0:48  0:43  1:46  4:03
A.2.2 Replacement Ratio
Next we present the results for the case where we set the value for the replacement ratio
equal to 0:71; as estimated in Hall and Milgrom (2008), and then recalibrate the model
to match all other parameters (only cL; cH ; hI ; yH ; bL and bH change).
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Table A.6: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
cL = 0:900, cH = 3:143 Vacancy costs
AL = 0:665, AH = 1:463 Matching e¢ ciency parameters
hI = 2:959 Search cost
yH = 1:592 Relative productivity of high-skilled workers
bL = 0:696; bH = 1:122 Unemployment ow incomes
 = 0:077 Transferability of foreign human capital
Table A.7 presents the results regarding a movement from a no cross-skill matching
to a cross-skill matching regime. The results are to be compared with those in Table 3.
As can be seen, the di¤erences are qualitatively in the same direction and quantitatively
small.
Table A.7: The E¤ects of Cross-skill Matching
From No Cross-skill Matching to Cross-skill Matching
Value % Change
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:02
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:99
Labor Market Tightness (L) 2:14
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:12
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 18:75
Labor Market Tightness (H)  29:60
Overall Natives
Wage  0:08
Unemployment Rate 3:51
Surplus1 0:01
Surplus2  0:06
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:24
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:99
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 13:96
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  3:68
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 8:26
Unemployment Rate  81:89
Overall Immigrants
Wage 3:62
Unemployment Rate  51:31
Table A.8 presents the e¤ects of immigration inux. The results are to be compared
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with those in Table 4. As can be seen, the di¤erences are qualitatively in the same
direction and quantitatively small.
Table A.8: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:19 0:01 0:19
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  10:11  0:60  10:40
Labor Market Tightness (L) 25:37 1:30 26:26
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:00 0:05 0:05
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:64  7:03  6:39
Labor Market Tightness (H)  1:29 16:07 14:45
Overall Natives
Wage 0:04 0:04 0:08
Unemployment Rate  7:22  2:33  9:32
Surplus1 0:86 0:30 1:14
Surplus2 1:17 0:37 1:51
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 2:47 0:15 2:54
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  10:11  0:60  10:40
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:43 1:84 2:22
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:15 1:67 1:52
Wage (wIHL) 1:93  0:70 1:23
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 1:94  6:35  4:44
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:57 1:80 2:31
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  9:03  2:17  10:72
Overall Immigrants
Wage  0:36 4:31 2:97
Unemployment Rate  3:07  10:75  10:63
Table A.9 presents the e¤ects from a change in the transferability of foreign human
capital. The initial state is the one where  = 0:077 (overeducation ratio for high-skilled
immigrants 20%). The di¤erences between Tables 5 and A.9 are qualitatively in the same
direction and quantitatively small.
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Table A.9: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:60
Overeducation Ratio (%) 25:7 15:4 7:4 1:5
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:00  0:00  0:01  0:02
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:18 0:18 0:62 1:16
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:37  0:38  1:31  2:43
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:03 0:02 0:02  0:10
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 4:32  2:64  3:01 13:74
Labor Market Tightness (H)  8:28 5:63 6:44  23:19
Overall Natives
Wage  0:02 0:01 0:01  0:08
Unemployment Rate 1:03  0:58  0:35 4:54
Surplus1 0:01  0:02  0:13  0:37
Surplus2  0:01  0:01  0:13  0:50
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:04  0:04  0:15  0:28
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:18 0:18 0:62 1:16
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  7:25 6:78 21:22 37:21
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  7:30 6:03 16:72 25:58
Wage (wIHL) 2:88  3:35  13:85  35:64
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 28:31  23:15  63:10  92:64
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  6:58 6:78 23:20 37:21
Unemployment Rate 6:40  6:16  21:67  52:35
Overall Immigrants
Wage  2:28 2:38 8:10 15:19
Unemployment Rate 0:48  0:43  1:45  3:87
A.2.3 Relative Search Cost
In Tables A.10 and A.11 we present the results for the case where we change the value for
the relative search cost parameter  but keep all other parameter values the same. Table
A.10 presents the e¤ects of an immigration inux. These results are to be compared with
those presented in Table 4, where  = 0:5. As can be seen, the di¤erences are qualitatively
in the same direction and quantitatively small.
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Table A.10: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
 = 0:75
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:25  0:00 0:25
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  7:89 0:09  7:72
Labor Market Tightness (L) 19:10  0:20 18:62
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:00 0:07 0:06
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:26  5:46  5:18
Labor Market Tightness (H)  0:53 12:15 11:48
Overall Natives
Wage 0:10 0:04 0:13
Unemployment Rate  5:85  1:30  7:08
Surplus1 0:97 0:31 1:26
Surplus2 1:15 0:33 1:46
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 2:04  0:02 2:00
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  7:89 0:09  7:72
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:25 1:95 2:18
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:06 1:21 1:14
Wage (wIHL) 0:99  0:44 0:56
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 1:39  5:12  3:73
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:34 1:69 2:18
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  7:02  1:21  8:01
Overall Immigrants
Wage  0:19 3:41 2:40
Unemployment Rate  0:81  10:34  8:34
Table A.11 presents the results after a change in : In all cases, the initial situation is
a value of  = 0:077 (overeducation ratio for high-skilled immigrants 18:5%). The di¤er-
ences between Tables 5 and A.11 are qualitatively in the same direction and quantitatively
small.
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Table A.11: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:80
Overeducation Ratio (%) 23:8 14:2 6:7 1:2
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:00  0:00  0:01  0:01
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:05 0:05 0:19 0:27
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:12  0:12  0:41  0:57
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:04 0:03 0:03  0:14
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 3:69  2:20  2:22 11:40
Labor Market Tightness (H)  7:14 4:65 4:68  19:81
Overall Natives
Wage  0:02 0:01 0:01  0:08
Unemployment Rate 0:88  0:51  0:41 3:06
Surplus1 0:00  0:02  0:14  0:40
Surplus2  0:01  0:02  0:14  0:46
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:01  0:01  0:05  0:07
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:05 0:05 0:19 0:27
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  10:10 9:33 28:81 49:45
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  6:70 5:53 15:36 23:58
Wage (wIHL) 1:94  2:25  9:23  23:59
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 28:56  23:32  63:59  93:24
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  8:12 8:44 28:81 51:82
Unemployment Rate 6:51  6:30  22:39  54:60
Overall Immigrants
Wage  2:73 2:85 9:16 17:78
Unemployment Rate 0:56  0:52  1:80  4:74
Next we present the case where we set the value of the relative search cost parameter
 = 0:75 and then recalibrate the model to match all targets. Table A.3 presents the new
parameter values (only the values of cH , cL; and hI change).
Table A.12: Values of the Calibrated Parameters
Value Interpretation
cL = 1:188; cH = 4:236 Vacancy costs
AL = 0:665, AH = 1:463 Matching e¢ ciency parameters
hI = 3:004 Search cost
yH = 1:579 Relative productivity of high-skilled workers
bL = 0:484; bH = 0:779 Unemployment ow incomes
 = 0:077 Transferability of foreign human capital
Table A.13 presents the e¤ects of a change in immigration equal to that found in the
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data. The di¤erences between Tables 4, A.10 and A.13 are qualitatively in the same
direction and quantitatively small.
Table A.13: The E¤ects of the 2000-2009 Immigration Inux
(Percentage Changes)
Variable IL IH IL and IH
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:26  0:00 0:25
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  8:07 0:07  7:91
Labor Market Tightness (L) 19:57  0:14 19:13
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:00 0:07 0:07
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 0:26  5:55  5:27
Labor Market Tightness (H)  0:53 12:37 11:70
Overall Natives
Wage 0:10 0:04 0:14
Unemployment Rate  5:83  1:44  7:20
Surplus1 1:00 0:32 1:30
Surplus2 1:18 0:36 1:52
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 2:17  0:02 2:13
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  8:07 0:07  7:91
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH) 0:29 2:19 2:46
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  0:06 1:31 1:25
Wage (wIHL) 1:01  0:43 0:59
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 1:32  5:07  3:74
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage 0:41 1:80 2:17
Unemployment Rate (u
I
H
IH
)  7:25  1:23  8:25
Overall Immigrants
Wage 0:27 2:95 2:47
Unemployment Rate  1:07  10:21  8:46
Table A.14 presents the e¤ects from a change in the transferability of foreign human
capital. The initial state is the one where  = 0:077 (overeducation ratio for high-skilled
immigrants 20%). The di¤erences between Tables 5, A.11 and A.14 are qualitatively in
the same direction and quantitatively small.
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Table A.14: The E¤ects of a Change in the Transferability of Human Capital
(Percentage Changes)
Variable  = 0:06  = 0:10  = 0:20  = 0:80
Overeducation Ratio (%) 25:6 15:4 7:4 1:4
Unskilled Natives
Wage (wNLL) 0:00  0:00  0:01  0:01
Unemployment Rate ( u
N
L
1  )  0:06 0:06 0:20 0:31
Labor Market Tightness (L) 0:12  0:12  0:43  0:65
Skilled Natives
Wage (wNHH)  0:05 0:03 0:04  0:14
Unemployment Rate (u
N
H
 ) 3:97  2:43  2:86 10:53
Labor Market Tightness (H)  7:67 5:17 6:10  18:54
Overall Natives
Wage  0:03 0:02 0:02  0:08
Unemployment Rate 1:03  0:61  0:62 3:05
Surplus1  0:00  0:02  0:13  0:41
Surplus2  0:00  0:01  0:13  0:48
Unskilled Immigrants
Wage (wILL) 0:01  0:02  0:05  0:08
Unemployment Rate (u
I
L
IL
)  0:06 0:06 0:20 0:31
Skilled Immigrants
Wage (wIHH)  11:21 10:46 32:55 56:27
Employment Rate ( e
I
HH
IH
)  7:21 5:99 16:70 25:69
Wage (wIHL) 1:90  2:22  9:21  24:13
Overeducation Ratio ( e
I
HL
IH
) 27:95  22:98  62:99  92:93
Overall Skilled Immigrants
Wage  8:41 8:99 30:85 57:31
Unemployment Rate 6:44  6:21  21:88  53:29
Overall Immigrants
Wage  2:76 2:96 10:20 19:13
Unemployment Rate 0:58  0:53  1:81  4:70
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